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INTRODUCTION
Collaborative law is growing up. Born almost twenty years ago out
of frustration with conventional adversarial practice, collaborative law
is an infant no longer. This interest-based, settlement-oriented dispute
resolution process differs from others in that the parties and lawyers
agree at the outset to eschew litigation at all costs-including disquali-
fication of all counsel should the process fail.' It is precisely this defin-
ing characteristic that is causing collaborative law problems. For years,
those of us with an interest in the intersection of ADR and professional
ethics have been pointing at collaborative law and its pinch points with
the law governing lawyers.2 In a whole host of areas-conflicts, confi-
* Professor of Law, The Ohio State Moritz College of Law.
1. See Christopher M. Fairman, A Proposed Model Rule for Collaborative Law, 21
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 73, 78-80 (2005) (describing the collaborative law model).
2. See, e.g., Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers' Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and
Collaboration: The End of the Legal Profession and the Beginning of Professional Pluralism,
90 IOWA L. REV. 475 (2005); Larry R. Spain, Collaborative Law: A Critical Reflection
on Whether a Collaborative Orientation Can Be Ethically Incorporated into the
Practice of Law, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 141 (2004); John Lande, Possibilities for
Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice of Lawyer Disqualification and Process Control in a
New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIo ST. L.J. 1315 (2003); James K. L. Lawrence,
Collaborative Lawyering: A New Development in Conflict Resolution, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 431 (2002); see also Brian Roberson, Comment, Let's Get Together: An
Analysis of the Applicability of the Rules of Professional Conduct to Collaborative Law,
2007 J. Disp. RESOL. 255 (2007); Elizabeth K. Strickland, Comment, Putting
"Counselor" Back in the Lawyer's Job Description: Why More States Should Adopt
Collaborative Law Statutes, 84 N.C. L. REV. 979, 1001 (2006) (advocating adoption of
statutes to address ethical problems); Joshua Isaacs, Current Developments, A New
Way to Avoid the Courtroom: The Ethical Implications Surrounding Collaborative Law, 18
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 833 (2005); Zachery Z. Annable, Comment, Beyond the
Thunderdome - The Search for a New Paradigm of Modern Dispute Resolution: The
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dentiality, informed consent, termination, and the like-collaborative
law can be in tension with lawyer ethics. I have repeatedly called for
clarity, guidance, and uniformity in the creation of an ethical founda-
tion for collaborative law.3 In 2007, collaborative law is confronting
this challenge.
In a trilogy of major events, the ethics of collaborative law now
takes center stage. In February 2007, for the first time, a state bar eth-
ics committee found collaborative law per se unethical as it is conven-
tionally practiced.4 No longer are ethical concerns merely an
academic exercise; they are a reality. A second major development is
the current effort to create a Uniform Collaborative Law Act. Foreshad-
owing a need for uniformity and guidance, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) appointed first a
Study Committee and later a Drafting Committee for the Uniform Col-
laborative Law Act.5 The NCCUSL Drafting Committee has already
produced a working draft of a model act with its core feature being
provisions to answer ethical concerns about confidentiality and privi-
lege. 6 A third ethical milestone comes from the American Bar Associa-
tion. In its latest formal ethics opinion, the ABA Standing Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility squarely addresses the com-
patibility of collaborative law with the Model Rules scope limitation
and concludes there is no violation.7
This is far from the last word on the ethics of collaborative law.
The future of collaborative law surely holds many unanswered ethical
questions. However, when considered in combination, the three events
of 2007 should be encouraging for the collaborative law movement. To
be sure, ethical concerns are real and potentially limiting to the growth
of the practice. However, our existing ethics regimes, along with pro-
Advent of Collaborative Lawyering and its Conformity with the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 157, 168 (2004-05) ("Because of the accommodation for
the adversarial paradigm on which the Model Rules were crafted, I join those authors
who think that it would probably be best to push for the implementation of new
ethical standards to accommodate ADR processes like collaborative lawyering.").
3. See, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, Ethics and Collaborative Lawyering: Why Put
Old Hats on New Heads?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 505 (2003) [hereinafter
Fairman, Old Hats]; Fairman, supra note 1; Christopher M. Fairman, Why We Still Need
A Model Rule for Collaborative Law: A Reply to Professor Lande, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 707 (2007) [hereinafter Fairman, A Reply].
4. See Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 115 (2007).
5. See Fairman, A Reply, supra note 3, at 728-29 (chronicling the NCCUSL effort).
6. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws,
COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT (Oct. 2007 Discussion Draft).
7. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof. Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-447 (2007).
[Vol. 30:237238
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posed modifications, can respond to these challenges. What we are
witnessing is merely the growing pains of an ADR process.
I. AGES AND STAGES OF COLLABORATIVE LAW
Institutions, like individuals, go through distinct stages of devel-
opment. Alternative dispute resolution is not immune from this natu-
ral pattern. To better understand the recent events shaping
collaborative law, consider first where this ADR process has been.
A. An ADR Newcomer
Collaborative law is a dispute resolution process where parties
represented by counsel resolve their dispute themselves rather than
having a ruling imposed upon them by a court or arbitrator.8 While
counsel represents the parties during the collaborative law negotia-
tions, the role of collaborative lawyers is different from typical repre-
sentation. In collaborative law, lawyers encourage the parties to engage
in joint problem solving as opposed to a traditional adversarial role.
The heart of collaborative law is a written participation agreement
where the parties agree not to go to court for resolution of the dispute
during the collaborative process.9 If a party seeks judicial interven-
tion, the agreement requires that counsel for all parties must withdraw
from further representation.1 °
Collaborative law's meteoric rise is well known. A Minnesota fam-
ily law practitioner, Stu Webb, is credited as the first to articulate the
concept and put it into practice around 1990.11 Since then, thousands
of lawyers have been trained in the collaborative law model; tens of
thousands of cases have been resolved with it in the United States and
Canada.' 2 Collaborative law practice groups exist in virtually every
8. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT prefatory note (Oct. 2007 Discussion Draft).
9. See Chip Stewart, Colorado Ethics Opinion Says Collaborative Law Violates Rules
of Professional Conduct, 13 No. 3 Disp RESOL. MAG. 29 (Spring 2007) (describing
collaborative law).
10. Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. LJ. 317, 319-20
(2004).
11. Stu Webb, Collaborative Law: An Alternative For Attorneys Suffering 'Family Law
Burnout,' 18 No. 6 MATRIM. STRATEGIST 7 (2000).
12. Fairman, supra note 1, at 83 (thousands of lawyers trained); David A. Hoffman,
A Healing Approach to the Law, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 9, 2007 (tens of
thousands of cases resolved), http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1009/p09sO1-coop.
html.
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state in the nation. 13 Indeed, major law firms are even hiring partners
to head up their collaborative law sections. 14
As further testimony to its success, collaborative law is already
becoming institutionalized. Several states have enacted statutes recog-
nizing collaborative law.15 Utah is the most recent jurisdiction to do
so.16 Similarly, a number of courts have used their own court rules to
sanction collaborative law.' 7 Minnesota is a recent example. In Sep-
tember 2007, the Minnesota Supreme Court amended the General
Rules of Practice for the District Courts to define collaborative law and
make clear that such cases are subject to deferral from scheduling
orders.' More recognition of collaborative law should be expected.
The largest dispute resolution organization in the world, the ABA's Sec-
tion of Dispute Resolution, now has a Committee on Collaborative
Law. 19
13. See Hoffman, supra note 12.
14. For example, prominent Chicago divorce law firm Schiller DuCanto and Fleck
LLP has hired James R. Galvin as a partner and director of the firm's Collaborative
Law Practice. John Flynn Rooney, Collaborative Method Catches on with Divorce
Lawyers, CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULLETIN, Sept. 5, 2007, at 1.
15. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2013 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-70 to -79
(2006); TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 6.603, 153.0072 (2006). For a detailed discussion on the
California Collaborative Law Act see Andrew Schouten, Breaking Up Is No Longer Hard
To Do: The Collaborative Family Law Act, 38 McGEORGE L. REv. 125 (2007).
16. Utah recently established a mandatory divorce orientation course for all
parties with minor children who file a petition for temporary separation or divorce.
The course must include options available for proceeding with a divorce, including
collaborative law. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-11.4 (effective April 30, 2007).
17. See, e.g., CONTRA COSTA, CAL., LOCAL CT. RULE 12.5 (2007); L.A., CAL., LOCAL
CT. RULE, CH. 14, R. 14.26 (2007); S.F., CAL., UNIF. LOCAL RULES OF CT. R. 11.17
(2006); SONOMA COUNTY, CAL., LOCAL CT. RULE 9.25 (2006); EAST BATON ROUGE, LA.,
UNIF. RULES FOR LA. DIST. CTS. TIT. IV, § 3 (2005); UTAH CODE OF JUD. ADMIN. CH. 4,
ART. 5, R. 40510 (2006). Of particular importance to access to legal services, Chief
Judge of New York Judith Kaye recently announced plans to establish a Collaborative
Family Law Center in New York City; it will provide collaborative attorneys for clients
who cannot afford them. See Vivian Berger, Unaffordable Divorce, 188 NJ.L.J. 259
(April 23, 2007).
18. See Promulgation of Amendments to the Minnesota General Rules of Practice
for the District Courts, CX-89-1863 (Minn. Sept. 26, 2007). New Rule 111.05 on
collaborative law takes effect January 1, 2008. Id.
19. See Lawrence R. Mills, Members Seek A Broader Role for Peacemakers, 8/6/2007
NAT'L LJ. 52, (Col. 4) (describing 17,000 member Section of Dispute Resolution as
world's largest and reporting on the recent formation of a Collaborative Law
Committee to explore the use of collaborative law in both family and nonfamily
settings); Section of Dispute Resolution: Collaborative Law Committee, http://www.
abanet.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=DR035000 (last visited Oct. 14, 2007).
240 [Vol. 30:237
4
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol30/iss2/1
2008] COLLABORATIVE LAW AND THE CHALLENGE OF LEGAL ETHICS 241
What accounts for the early success of collaborative law? David A.
Hoffman, the Chair of this new committee, offers a concise
explanation:
[M]ost clients in a dispute are looking for an honorable peace, not war,
and collaborative lawyers can be just as zealous about seeking such a
peace as litigators are about victory in the courtroom. Empirical stud-
ies to date suggest that clients in collaborative law cases are satisfied
with both the process and the settlements achieved. One of the pri-
mary reasons for this success appears to be self-selection - in other
words, the clients and lawyers who embrace the collaborative process
tend to be those who are seeking to resolve conflict rather than prolong
it. In addition, the collaborative law process creates a container for con-
flict - one that promotes information-sharing, problem-solving, and
respectful communication. Sometimes the collaborative process
enables people to do more than just settle their differences but to actu-
ally resolve them on a deeper level than is possible with the bare-
knuckles negotiation that is typical in noncollaborative cases.20
Anecdotal accounts of success by collaborative lawyers, like Hoff-
man's, also find support in the academic literature.
Prompted by the rapid growth of collaborative law, the Canadian
Department of Justice commissioned a three year study of the process;
Professor Julie Macfarlane of the University of Windsor was the princi-
pal investigator. The recently published results of this multi-year study
were based upon case studies of family law disputes where collabora-
tive lawyering was used in the United States and Canada. 21 The initial
inquiry of Macfarlane's study was to explore the differences that the
collaborative model makes to the process and outcome of divorce dis-
putes.22 After gathering data from over 150 separate interviews from
2001-04,23 Macfarlane concludes that collaborative law is a separate
and distinct ADR process-one that "fosters a spirit of openness, coop-
eration, and commitment to finding a solution that is qualitatively dif-
ferent, at least in many cases, from the atmosphere created by
conventional lawyer-to-lawyer negotiations-even those undertaken
with a cooperative spirit.
2 4
20. Hoffman, supra note 12.
21. See JULIE MACFARLANE, THE EMERGING PHENOMENON OF COLLABORATIVE FAMILY
LAW (CFL): A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF CFL CASES 13-15 (June 2005) (Can.) (describing
methodology), available at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/pad/reports/2005-FCY-
1/2005-FCY-l.pdf.
22. Id. at vii.
23. Id. at 15.
24. Id. at 78.
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Not only did the Macfarlane study confirm that collaborative law
is a distinct and separate ADR process, the research also bolsters many
of the claims of collaborative practitioners. Macfarlane reports that the
"clearest evidence of success relates to the satisfaction-joy even-of
family lawyers who have embraced collaborative law as an alternative
to litigation. '2 5 Not only are the lawyers satisfied with collaborative
law, but their clients are too. Macfarlane concludes:
Client satisfaction with CFL is generally high. Many clients emerge
from the traumatic process of divorce with the clear sense that the col-
laborative process has enabled them to behave honourably toward their
ex-spouse and their family. Most also feel positive-some very posi-
tive-about their relationship with their lawyer.
26
On the ultimate question of the outcome of disputes, Macfarlane's
results are also encouraging for the collaborative law movement. She
found sufficient data to support the assertion that collaborative four-
ways are able to largely avoid the reactive and defensive bargaining
dynamic of the adversarial model while engendering and sustaining a
climate of cooperative negotiation.2 7 The results of this process were
"both fair within a legal standard and satisfactory to the parties. '"28
There was no evidence from the study that collaborative cases resulted
in weaker parties bargaining away their legal rights.29 This study dem-
onstrates that, to a large extent, collaborative law is fulfilling many of
its promises.
B. Stunted Growth
Given this record of success, collaborative law should be
embraced by all types of practitioners and applied to varying disputes.
However, collaborative law remains a practice almost entirely limited
to the area of family law, typically divorces. Whether collaborative law
can overcome its stunted growth and eventually be incorporated into
areas outside of family law remains to be seen. How the practice han-
dles questions of legal ethics is likely a large part of the prescription.
25. Id. at 77. This increased personal satisfaction certainly provides evidence for
the rapid spread of collaborative law. See id. ("The study found that the primary
motivator for lawyers embracing CFL was personal value realignment-in other words,
finding a way to practice law that fit better with their beliefs and values than the
traditional litigation model did.")
26. Id. at 78.
27. MACFARLANE, supra note 21, at 77.
28. Id. at 77.
29. Id. at 78.
[Vol. 30:237242
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1. Family Law Limitation
The collaborative law model has qualities that should also appeal
to practitioners and parties in non-family law cases. Often the same
incentive structure found in family law is mirrored in other types of
civil cases. For example, if the parties have a long-term relationship or
commitment, or share a common objective of preserving a working
relationship with the other party, then it would be beneficial for law-
yers to avoid adversarial tactics in resolving the dispute. 30 Addition-
ally, parties to disputes where a premium is placed on confidentiality
and privacy could also find value in the collaborative law process.3 1
Collaborative law can even be targeted to specific populations where
litigation is viewed as an unacceptable or incomplete method of dis-
pute resolution.3 2
Consequently, collaborative lawyers and commentators have
touted its usefulness in a wide variety of legal disputes. The biggest
push by collaborative law promoters has been for its application to
general commercial disputes. Lawrence Maxwell, President of Texas
Collaborative Law Council, describes the rationale:
The collaborative process is the business imperative of our time. The
process captures the exponential power of cooperation. In our fast
moving, complex and demanding world, resolving disputes in litiga-
tion is simply too costly, too painful, too ineffective and too destruc-
tive. It just makes sense to focus on the interests and goals of the
parties, have a full and complete disclosure of relevant information,
avoid the costly discovery fights in litigation and communicate face to
face rather than through intermediaries. 3
3
30. Gary L. Voegele, Linda K. Wray & Ronald D. Ousky, Collaborative Law: A
Useful Tool for the Family Law Practitioner to Promote Better Outcomes, 33 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 971, 1025 (2007).
31. Id. at 1026.
32. For example, the International Academy of Collaborative Professionals (IACP)
has targeted religious communities who disfavor civil litigation. See P. Oswin
Chrisman, Gay G. Cox & Petra Novotna, Collaborative Practice Mediation: Are We
Ready to Serve This Emerging Market?, 6 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 451, 459 (2006).
Similarly, the Asheville, North Carolina, Collaborative Lawyers Group promotes
collaborative law to the GLBT community. See Press Release, Asheville Collaborative
Lawyers, Collablaw.org Sponsors Event for GLBT Community (Sept. 12, 2007), http://
www.collablaw.org/Press%20Release%20GLBT%2OEvent.htm.
33. Chrisman et al., supra note 32, at 458 n.25. Lawrence R. Maxwell, Jr., L.L.B.,
Presentation to IACP Core Collaborative Practice Skills Inst. in Dallas: The
Collaborative Dispute Resolution Process is Catching On In the Civil Arena (June
2005).
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The laundry list of specific commercial cases suitable for collaborative
law to preserve ongoing relationships includes: employment law
issues, wills and probate, landlord and tenant disputes, intellectual
property cases such as royalty disputes, labor law grievances, and con-
struction project disputes. 34
Professional malpractice claims, especially medical malpractice,
are also singled out as a "natural fit" for collaborative law and its abil-
ity to provide privacy and confidentiality.35 In medical malpractice
cases in particular, the collaborative "process encourages early discus-
sions that can involve disclosure, apology (to the extent called for),
proposed future patient safety solutions, and healing. '36 One theoreti-
cal benefit of collaborative law is increased attention to patient safety.
According to one commentator, collaborative law brings "the private
interest of the injured person into alignment with the public interest in
preventing injuries to the general public in the future. 37 Conse-
quently, collaborative law supporters contend it is superior to both liti-
gation 38 and mediation 3 9 in the medical error context.
Regardless of the theoretical compatibility of collaborative law to
varying disputes, it has not migrated into the realm of general civil
cases. Rather, collaborative law remains pigeonholed into the family
law area.40 The failure of the collaborative law model to gain traction
34. See Chrisman et al., supra note 32,. at 458; Voegele et al., supra note 30, at
1025.
35. Voegele et al., supra note 30, at 1026; Kathleen Clark, The Use of Collaborative
Law in Medical Error Situations, 19 No. 6 HEALTH LAW. 19, 19 (2007).
36. See Clark, supra note 35, at 19.
37. Id.
38. Id. ("Unlike litigation, the collaborative process permits and encourages
patient safety issues to be addressed immediately on a global, rather than an
individual, basis.").
39. As to the superiority to mediation, Clark states that by the time a medical
malpractice matter goes to mediation, "the parties are generally entrenched in their
adversarial positions, with little hope of interest-based negotiation." Id. at 20 n.15.
However, in touting the collaborative model, the same author states that in "a situation
where an injured party sues and the process becomes too daunting, expensive or time
and emotion consuming, the injured party (and his/her attorney) could move into a
collaborative process, in the hope that an interest-based, face-to-face process would
bring a reasonably speedy resolution to the matter." Id. at 20. It seems to me that this
situation would present parties that are as equally entrenched as the mediation
example, and consequently just as unlikely to embrace interest based negotiation.
40. John Lande, Lessons for Collaborative Lawyers and Other Dispute Resolution
Professionals from Colorado Bar Association Ethics Opinion 115, April 2007, http://
www.mediate.com/articles/landeJ3.cfm ("Virtually all Collaborative Law cases have
been in family matters, despite great efforts to promote it in non-family ('civil')
matters."); see Voegele et al., supra note 30, at 1025-26 (describing desire but lack of
[Vol. 30:237
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outside of family law is not due to a lack of promotion 41 or a misun-
derstanding of the potential benefits. The Texas experience illustrates
this point. Despite embracing collaborative law in the family law con-
text and being one of the first jurisdictions codifying the practice in
the Texas Family Code, the movement still cannot secure similar access
to non-family law disputes. The Texas Legislature considered bills in
the last three sessions to formalize collaborative law in more types of
civil cases, but each year, these bills were defeated.42 What accounts
for this stunted growth of collaborative law? One explanation is the
current controversy concerning its compatibility with legal ethics.43
2. Ethics as a Glass Ceiling
Collaborative law's sharp break from the adversarial model of dis-
pute resolution also implicates a potential separation from the ethical
rules governing lawyers. This is not surprising given that lawyer ethical
success in penetrating non-family law cases). Even within the family law context,
collaborative law is not fully utilized. It could also be a useful process for non-
dissolution family law matters such as disputes arising over antenuptial agreements,
post-nuptial agreements, post-decree disputes, and third-party custody situations. Id.
at 1026.
41. See, e.g., Chrisman et al., supra note 32, at 458-59 ("A task force of the
International Academy of Collaborative Professionals (IACP) met in Chicago in August
2005, to explore how to best promote the use of this new approach in all areas of civil
jurisprudence.... The group decided that the immediate emphasis should be placed
on expanding the process into the probate and estate planning field, the health care
industry (especially into medical malpractice matters), and the religious communities
who disfavor civil litigation."); Collablaw.org, Asheville (North Carolina) Collaborative
Lawyers Group, Is Collaborative Law Only for Divorces?, http://www.collablaw.org/
notjustfordivorce.htm ("It can be used in family situations other than divorces-for
example, resolving a will contest. Or it can be used in an employment situation where
an employee and an employer have a dispute or where two co-workers are in conflict.
Neighbors with property disputes can use collaborative law too. We are experimenting
with using Collaborative Law in Medical Malpractice, real estate disputes, and other
civil matters.") (last visited Oct. 25, 2007).
42. See Mary Flood, Collaborative Law Can Make Divorces Cheaper, Civilized,
Houston Chron., June 4, 2007, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/
flood/4856355.html.
43. See, e.g., John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice of
Lawyer Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1315, 1329 (2003) ("[T]he disqualification agreement is a major barrier to
acceptance by major businesses and law firms."). I consider attorney reluctance to use
collaborative law because of the mandatory withdrawal provision of the participation
agreement (disqualification agreement) as inherently a question of legal ethics due to
its relationship between scope of representation and termination rules.
9
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codes were forged prior to the general acceptance of ADR.44 The con-
troversy over compatibility with legal ethics creates both internal and
external pressures on collaborative law. For those lawyers on the
inside of collaborative law, there is an increased burden to be sensitive
to and comply with ethical rules. This need is magnified given the
research that shows collaborative lawyers are not aware of the extent of
ethical challenges in their own practice. From the outside, ethical chal-
lenges may lead to the containment of collaborative law to the family
law area. Ethical issues certainly provide fodder to those outsiders who
hope to limit the growth of collaborative law in favor of traditional
adversarial practice or other forms of dispute resolution.
It is ironic that the defining characteristics of collaborative law-
and the fervor with which collaborative lawyers embrace them-also
creates risk for the practice. Ethical questions have been raised about
collaborative law concerning informed consent, conflicts, scope of rep-
resentation, candor, confidentiality, and termination. I have suggested
elsewhere the specific problems in these areas and my belief that col-
lectively these ethical concerns about collaborative law limit its growth
outside the family law arena.45 While some of these trouble spots
appear headed for resolution by the developments of 2007, sufficient
unresolved tensions exist that are cause for continued concern. Con-
sider the following examples.
Informed consent is a paramount ethical consideration with col-
laborative law.4 6 Many key provisions of the ADR process hinge upon
the ability of the client to give informed consent to modify the usual
relationship between lawyer and client. The very decision by a putative
collaborative client to choose the process instead of another form of
dispute resolution, such as mediation or litigation, should be the prod-
uct of informed consent. Similarly, the compatibility of collaborative
law's fundamental characteristics with legal ethics requires informed
consent. The advance agreement to the attorney withdrawal, voluntary
disclosure of confidential information, and avoidance of third party
conflicts all are predicated on a knowing decision by the client to allow
44. See Fairman, Old Hats, supra note 3, at 508-509 ("Since the promulgation of the
Model Rules in 1983, both the use and acceptance of ADR have rapidly expanded.
However, when the Model Rules were drafted, even the two most prevalent forms of
ADR, arbitration and mediation, were essentially unknown outside of a few narrow
practice sectors. Not surprisingly, the Model Rules as drafted provided little guidance
to lawyers participating in ADR. Instead, they reflected the then dominant paradigm:
lawyers are advocates in an adversarial system.").
45. See Fairman, supra note 1, at 74.
46. See Voegele et al., supra note 30, at 1013; MACFARLANE, supra note 21, at 64.
[Vol. 30:237
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the attorney to act in a way different from the professional norm. 47
Thus, from the decision to enter the collaborative process to its termi-
nation, informed client consent is critical.
Despite its overwhelming importance, collaborative lawyers them-
selves give little attention to ethical issues. The Macfarlane study dra-
matically concludes that "[o]utside a small group of experienced
practitioners, the study has found little explicit acknowledgment and
recognition of ethical issues among CFL lawyers." 48 Especially where
practitioners have taken only a short course exposing them to collabo-
rative law and their actual experience is limited, "sensitivity to poten-
tial ethical dilemmas appears to be low."4 9 As a result, "CFL lawyers
manage the day-to-day and meeting-by-meeting dynamics of their cases
within a context of almost unconstrained professional discretion." 0
The lack of recognition of ethical problems is magnified when
informed consent is the issue. The attorney may be tempted to "over-
sell or spin advice in favor of a particular dispute resolution method to
a client, especially when a non-adversarial process such as Collabora-
tive Law is compared to traditional litigation."'" This, of course, under-
mines a client's informed consent to the selected process.
In an effort to promote collaborative law, some collaborative con-
verts underestimate ethical concerns. In January 2006, Ann Curry
interviewed a pair of collaborative lawyers and clients about their
experiences. Curry asks collaborative lawyer Neil Kozek about poten-
tial risks with collaborative divorce:
Curry: "So Neil, what are the risks of going the collaborative law
route?"
Kozek: "There are no real risks Ann. "52
With a national audience being introduced to collaborative law for the
first time, the "no real risks" answer may help create clients, but not
informed ones.
Another example of promotion is targeted at collaborative lawyers
themselves. Collaborative lawyer Howard Goldstein writes in Ten
"Guaranteed" Practice Building Ideas:
47. MACFARLANE, supra note 21, at 64-65.
48. Id. at 63.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 64.
51. Voegele et al., supra note 30, at 1012.
52. The Today Show (NBC television broadcast Jan. 17, 2006) (Ann Curry
interviews Katherine Miller, Neil Kozek and collaborative clients, Michelle and Tom
Gesky, about collaborative divorce), http://www.collaborativelawny.com/todayshow.
php.
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Each of us gets clients who call us for divorce representation .... Few
of them know about Collaborative Practice, and they won't ask for it. It
is your job to offer it as an option, and ... dare I say this ... SELL IT
TO THEM .... If you do not believe that this is the best process for
people to use in getting a divorce, then you can't sell it. If you do
believe in it then you should consider it your goal to have every appro-
priate client at least offered the opportunity to use the Collaborative
Practice in their divorce, whether they ask for it or not.5 3
This type of aggressive promotion might induce collaborative lawyers
to be less than vigilant in fully informing prospective clients of their
options. This is precisely the opposite of what should occur.
More care, not less, should be taken when recruiting collaborative
clients. Parties who suffer from serious mental health issues, sub-
stance abuse, or physical abuse are not strong candidates for this pro-
cess. 5 4 Even those who might be model collaborative clients deserve
all the information to make an informed choice. Yet, research suggests
"there is reason to be concerned that some clients do not fully compre-
hend all the ramifications of the [collaborative law] commitment. 5 5
Hence, a lack awareness of ethical issues by attorneys or over selling
the process can have a genuine effect on clients and informed consent
at many levels.
Ethical issues also form an external limitation on the potential
expansion of collaborative law. The primary resistance to collaborative
law in nonfamily civil disputes is the withdrawal provision.56 High
stakes and complex commercial litigation is a significant revenue gen-
erator for both lawyers and law firms. The potential loss of attorneys'
fees, from large fee awards or revenue streams, can cause concern for
would-be collaborative counsel. 57 Similarly, there is serious risk of cli-
ent loss associated with the withdrawal provision. Attorneys could lose
long-term clients; even the risk of losing a new client with a strong case
could create an incentive not to recommend collaborative law.5 8
This ethical tension has led some lawyers to promote "collabora-
tive law lite"-cooperative law. Cooperative law is essentially collabora-
tive law without the withdrawal provision.5 9 In this intermediary
53. Howard I. Goldstein, Ten "Guaranteed" Practice Building Ideas, 3 COLLABORATIVE
LJ. 15, 15 (2005).
54. Voegele et al., supra note 30, at 1012.
55. MACFARLANE, supra note 21, at 65.
56. Voegele et al., supra note 30, at 1026.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. (noting proposed solutions include consideration of utilizing a
cooperative law model for the dispute and dropping the disqualification provision).
[Vol. 30:237248
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model, the parties start out using the collaborative process, but the
parties and the lawyers retain the right to go to court in the event that a
settlement is not reached.6 ° Whether cooperative law is a genuine
alternative remains to be seen. Collaborative law proponents are
largely critical of cooperative law contending that, absent the with-
drawal provision, the parties lack the incentive to settle.6 ' This tension
between the two camps is another ethical challenge for the collabora-
tive movement. 62
The ultimate external check on collaborative law comes from the
state bar ethics committees. Prior to 2007, five jurisdictions examined
collaborative law's compatibility with ethical rules.63 While collec-
tively these opinions raise ethical red flags, none found collaborative
law impermissible. 64 This all changed in February 2007 when the Col-
orado Bar Association's Ethics Committee issued Formal Opinion 115
declaring collaborative law per se unethical.
60. Robert W. Lueck, The Collaborative Law (R)evolution: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come In Nevada, 3 COLLABORATIVE LJ. 25, 27 (2005).
61. See Frances Z. Calafiore, ADR Community Not Immune To Turf Wars, CONN. L.
TRIB., Apr. 3, 2006, at 16 (describing the turf war between collaborative and
cooperative law groups).
62. See infra notes 183-196 and accompanying text.
63. The first jurisdiction to offer guidance was Minnesota in the form of an
advisory letter opinion from Minnesota's Office of Lawyers Professional
Responsibility. See Letter from Patrick R. Burns, Senior Assistant Director, Office of
Lawyers Professional Responsibility, Minnesota Judicial Center, to Laurie Savran,
Collaborative Law Institute (March 12, 1997). North Carolina was the first
jurisdiction to issue a formal ethics opinion. See N.C. St. Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 1
(2002). In 2004, the Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics and
Professional Responsibility issued an informal opinion on collaborative law (authored
by Professor Laurel Terry of Penn State-Dickinson School of Law). The Committee
dealt with only a general question of whether the practice of collaborative law in a
domestic relations context was ethical provided clients are given full disclosure and
their rights waived by choosing the collaborative law method. See Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm.
Leg. Eth. & Profl Resp., Informal Op. 2004-24 (2004). The following year at the
request of a collaborative law practice group, the Kentucky Bar Association explored
the general compatibility of the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct and
collaborative family law. See Ky. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. E-425 (2005).
Similarly, New Jersey weighed in with a formal opinion in 2005. See NJ. Advisory
Comm. on Profl Ethics, Op. 699 (2005); see also NJ. Advisory Comm. on Profl
Ethics, Op. 711 (2007).
64. For a thorough examination of each of these ethics opinions, see Fairman,
supra note 1, at 108-116 (discussing North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky) and
Fairman, A Reply, supra note 3, at 723-24 (discussing Minnesota and New Jersey).
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II. GROWING PAINS IN 2007
A. Colorado Ethics Opinion 115
Ironically, it was Colorado collaborative lawyers who asked the
Ethics Committee of the Colorado Bar Association to issue an opinion
on their practice-to silence the critics.65 That did not happen. On
February 24, 2007, the Committee issued Ethics Opinion 115 entitled
"Ethical Considerations in the Collaborative and Cooperative Law
Contexts. ' 66 Colorado Opinion 115 focused on the collaborative law
participation agreement and analyzed it as a nonconsentable conflict
under the 2007 version of Rule 1.7(b) of the Colorado Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.67 The Ethics Committee concluded: "It is the opinion
of this Committee that the practice of Collaborative Law violates Rule
1.7(b) of Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct insofar as a lawyer
participating in the process enters into a contractual agreement with
the opposing party requiring the lawyer to withdraw in the event that
the process is unsuccessful. 68
To reach this conclusion, the Ethics Committee started with the
2007 text of Rule 1.7(b). It provided in relevant part that a "lawyer
shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to ... a third person
... unless (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will
not be adversely affected; and (2) the client consents after consulta-
tion."69 Applying this rule to collaborative law, the Ethics Committee
found:
Collaborative Law, by definition, involves an agreement between the
lawyer and a "third person" (i.e., the opposing party) whereby the law-
yer agrees to impair his or her ability to represent the client. In particu-
lar, the lawyer agrees to discontinue the representation in the event
65. See Jane Pribek, Addressing Ethics Issues in Collaborative Divorce, http://www.
wislawjournal.com/special/adr2007/ethics.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2007) (quoting
co-president of Colorado Collaborative Law Professionals Mary Becker stating,
"Representatives of her group asked the committee to issue an opinion, to put the
detractors at ease.").
66. Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 115 (2007).
67. In the spring of 2007, the Colorado Supreme Court considered significant
revisions to the Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct. On April 12, 2007, the
Colorado Supreme Court repealed and readopted a new version of the Rules to take
effect on January 1, 2008. One of the significant changes between the now-repealed
2007 version and the current 2008 Rules is the text of Rule 1.7. Colorado has
jettisoned its unique formulation of the conflicts rule and now conforms verbatim to
Model Rule 1.7.
68. Id.
69. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.1.7(b) (repealed 2008).
[Vol. 30:237250
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that the Collaborative Law process is unsuccessful and the client
wishes to litigate the matter. The entry of the Collaborative Law Four-
Way Agreement therefore implicates Rule 1.7(b) of the Colorado Rules
of Professional Conduct.7 °
Having concluded a third party conflict exists, the Committee consid-
ered whether the client could effectively waive the conflict.
Under the 2007 version of Colorado Rule 1.7, a client's consent to
the representation notwithstanding a conflict is only effective where
the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected by the responsibilities to the third party.71 Thus, the critical
question boiled down to the likelihood that a conflict will happen and,
if it does, "whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's inde-
pendent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose
courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the
client."72 The Ethics Committee concluded that a client could not con-
sent because of the significant risk that a conflict could materialize.
The Committee described the situation in the following manner:
In fact, the conflict materializes whenever the process is unsuccessful
because, in that instance, the lawyer's contractual responsibilities to
the opposing party (the obligation to discontinue representing the cli-
ent) are in conflict with the obligations the lawyer has to the client (the
obligation to recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action
for the client). Second, the potential conflict inevitably interferes with
the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering the
alternative of litigation in a material way. Indeed, this course of action
that "reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client," or at least
considered, is foreclosed to the lawyer. 7
3
In an interesting footnote, however, Opinion 115 notes that while
lawyers are conflicted from signing the four-way agreements, clients
themselves were free to sign such agreements with each other. Footnote
11 states:
While it is not within this Committee's province to comment on legal
issues, it is axiomatic that private parties in Colorado may contract for
any lawful purpose. Thus, parties wishing to participate in a collabora-
tive environment may agree between each other to terminate their
respective lawyers in the event that the process fails, provided the law-
yer is not a party to that contract. Such agreements may promote the
valid purposes of Collaborative Law, including creating incentives for
settlement, generating a positive environment for negotiation, and fos-
70. Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 115 (2007).
71. Id.
72. Id. (quoting Colo. Rules of Profl Conduct R. 1.7 cmt. (2007)).
73. Id. (quoting Colo. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.7 cmt. (2007)).
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tering a continued relationship between the parties without violating
the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct.
74
Therefore, it appears that the Ethics Committee sees the technical act
of signing the participation agreement by the lawyers as the problem,
not the collaborative concept.7 5
The Committee reinforced this interpretation by its analysis of
cooperative law. Cooperative law is an offshoot of collaborative law
with the exception that there is no disqualification provision.7 6 The
Committee concluded that this distinction was all important: "Cooper-
ative Law, which is identical to Collaborative Law in all material
respects with the exception of the disqualification agreement is not per
se unethical. ' 77 While not an automatic violation of Colorado's ethics
regime, cooperative law still must be practiced within the bounds of
the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. After exploring many of
the ethical issues that are typically of concern with collaborative or
cooperative law practice-confidentiality, termination, informed con-
sent, and clients under disability-the Committee warned cooperative
law practitioners to be mindful of potential ethical pitfalls and comply
with all Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. 78
While Opinion 115 is significant as the first ethics opinion to find
collaborative law unethical,7 9 it is inherently limited in its effect. First,
the opinion applies to a single jurisdiction-Colorado. The ability to
export the analysis to other jurisdictions is severely constrained. Not
only does the Opinion rely on a unique version of Rule 1.7(c) that
describes circumstances in which a client's consent cannot be validly
74. Id. n.11.
75. This, of course, makes no sense. If the collaborative law process creates a third
party conflict because the lawyer cannot consider all strategic options, this conflict is
inherent in the collaborative law process, and should not hinge on a technical source
of the limitation.
76. See John Lande & Gregg Herman, Fitting the Forum to the Family Fuss: Choosing
Mediation, Collaborative Law, or Cooperative Law for Negotiating Divorce Cases, 42 FAM.
CT. REV. 280, 284 (2004) (describing cooperative law).
77. Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 115 (2007).
78. Id. Ironically, it is in the discussion of cooperative law that the opinion offers
useful ethical guidance for collaborative practice. See Posting of John Crouch to The
Family Law News Blog, http://familylaw.typepad.com/faimlyjaw news/2007/03/
critique-ofcol.html#more (Mar. 7, 2007, 00:34 EST) (noting "wise guidance" in
cooperative law discussion).
79. See Jill S. Chanen, A Warning to Collaborators, A.B.A. J., May 2007, at 22 ("[T]he
opinion is significant because it is the first time that this form of ADR has been
declared in violation of a state's rules of professional conduct.").
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obtained, 80 but Colorado itself has now abandoned its former version
of Rule 1.7 in favor of the Model Rule. Since no other jurisdiction has a
similar provision to Colorado's former Rule 1.7, the Opinion is self-
limiting.
Even within Colorado, the Opinion has other inherent limitations.
First, all opinions by the Colorado Bar Association Ethics Committee
are nonbinding. The Colorado Bar Association is a voluntary, private
organization; membership is not mandated by the state and it does not
regulate the conduct of lawyers. 8 ' Thus, opinions are "for advisory
purposes only and are not in any way binding on the Colorado
Supreme Court, the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, the Attorney Regula-
tion Committee, or the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel."82
Finally, the most significant limitation comes from the text of the
opinion itself. Footnote 11 appears to alleviate any negative impact on
collaborative law practice. All collaborative lawyers in Colorado need
to do in order to be compliant is merely refrain from actually signing
the participation agreement. Clients are free to enter into contracts
with each other to follow collaborative practices unabated. In essence,
Opinion 115 roadmaps an end run around its basic tenet.
Not surprisingly, local and international collaborative law groups
point to this type of quick fix. The Colorado Collaborative Law Profes-
sionals website now posts revised agreements available to members
only. The old four-way agreements have been replaced with an agree-
ment that each spouse signs only with the spouse's own attorney, as
well as an agreement with the other spouse that if the process should
fail the attorneys must withdraw.83 Similarly, the International Acad-
emy of Collaborative Professionals (IACP) Ethics Task Force released
its critique of Colorado Opinion 115 including its suggestion to use
Footnote 11 as a method of continuing collaborative practice in Colo-
rado.84 The Task Force also reported that "several Colorado judges
have opined in meetings and seminars that they would certainly
enforce the terms of such a contract between the parties and require
their respective lawyers to withdraw if their case went to court. "85
80. See IACP ETHICS TASK FORCE, THE ETHICS OF THE COLLABORATIVE PARTICIPATION
AGREEMENT: A CRITIQUE OF COLORADO'S MAVERICK ETHICS OPINION, at 2 (2006), http://
www.collaborativepractice.com/documents/IACPEthicsTaskForcearticle.pdf.
81. See IACP, supra note 80, at 2.
82. Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 115 (2007).
83. See Pribek, supra note <CITE _Ref53852691">.
84. See IACP, supra note 80, at 1.
85. Id. (critiquing and carefully dissecting the Colorado Opinion). The IACP
Ethics Task Force's thoughtful analysis exposes the weaknesses in the opinion's
17
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In the end, Colorado Opinion 115 is unlikely to have much trac-
tion either inside or outside of Colorado. By adopting a new version of
Rule 1.7 effective in January 2008, the Colorado Supreme Court has
removed the entire foundation of the Opinion-former Rule 1.7. With-
out a rule-based rationale, Opinion 115 literally implodes. Even if one
sets aside the tension between the Opinion and the current Rule 1.7,
the position taken by the Ethics Committee misunderstands the funda-
mental principle embodied in Model Rule 1.2 that a lawyer may limit
the scope or objectives of representation if the client consents after
consultation. 86 Informed consent is the critical question, not who per-
forms the perfunctory act of signing the participation agreement.8
7
The Colorado Ethics Committee appears to recognize the scope limita-
tion of Rule 1.2 as acceptable when it discusses and ultimately autho-
rizes cooperative law.88 The same should apply to collaborative law,
but-for the Committee's strange preoccupation with attorneys signing
the participation agreement.
The direct effect of Colorado Opinion 115 on collaborative prac-
tice is a localized chilling effect on the growth of the movement.8 9 Its
indirect effect is another matter. Colorado's action virtually compels
other jurisdictions to take a hard look at the ethical underpinnings of
collaborative law. 90 Even though Opinion 115's conclusion on collab-
orative law is unlikely to gain acceptance, it does highlight many. addi-
tional ethical tensions that await collaborative lawyers. These include
troublesome areas such as: a duty of confidentiality versus voluntary
disclosure, a client's advance agreement to terminate versus a material
adverse effect if the client is of limited income, a heightened need for
informed consent, and the role of a lawyer with a client under a disa-
bility. 9' As other jurisdictions scrutinize collaborative law, the com-
application of ethical rules to collaborative law and carefully explains the compatibility
of collaborative law with professional ethics rules.
86. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2006); see also ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Prol Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-447 (2007).
87. See IACP, supra note 80, at 3-4.
88. See Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 115 (2007).
89. See Diane J. Levin, Collaborative Law Unethical Says Colorado Bar Association,
http://www.mediate.com/pfriendly.cfm?id=2395 (last visited Oct. 8, 2007)
(describing chilling effect); Chanen, supra note 79, at 22 (quoting Denver family law
practitioner as describing situation as "a nightmare"); Hoffman, supra note 12 ("After
the Colorado opinion was issued, thousands of lawyers across the United States who
have been using the collaborative law process waited uneasily to see which way the
regulatory winds would blow in their states.").
90. See Pribek, supra note <CITE Ref53852691"> (providing examples of the
Colorado Opinion's reception in other jurisdictions).
91. See Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 115 (2007).
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patibility of the law governing lawyers with collaborative practice is
not a foregone conclusion.
Finally, the Colorado Opinion is sure to generate increased ten-
sion between collaborative practitioners and the fledgling cooperative
law movement. Prior to Opinion 115, little attention was paid to coop-
erative law.9 2 It is sure to receive a boost in notoriety from the impri-
matur of acceptability placed on it by Opinion 115. This may
exacerbate friction between these two groups of ADR practitioners.93
Hopefully dispute resolution professionals will be able to keep these
tensions in check, rather than fuel them into an all out ADR turf war.94
B. Uniform Collaborative Law Act
The need for new statutory or rule-based guidance for collabora-
tive law is a matter of academic debate.95 Whether or not the time is
right for a new model act on collaborative law, one is coming nonethe-
less. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) is in the process of drafting a Uniform Collaborative
Law Act (UCLA). At the July 2006 meeting of NCCUSL's Scope and
Program Committee, the Study Committee on Collaborative Law 96
reported that there were only two state enactments at the time and a
92. See Chanen, supra note 79 (describing cooperative law as "practically
nonexistent.").
93. See Chanen, supra note 79 (noting dilemma for the two groups).
94. See Frances Z. Calaflore, ADR Community Not Immune To Turf Wars, CONN. L.
TRIB. 16 (Apr. 3, 2006) (describing the turf war between collaborative and cooperative
law groups). See also infra notes 183-196 and accompanying text.
95. Professor John Lande and this author recently engaged in a colloquy on this
subject in the official law journal of the ABA Section on Dispute Resolution. See
generally Fairman, supra note 1 (advocating a Model Rule for collaborative law);
Fairman, A Reply, supra note 3 (defending the need for a Model Rule to guide
collaborative law practitioners); John Lande, Principles for Policymaking About
Collaborative Law and Other ADR Processes, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 619 (2007)
(enumerating the risks involved in creating a Model Rule for collaborative law
practitioners).
96. Prior to the appointment of the Drafting Committee, the NCCUSL had
appointed a Study Committee on Collaborative Law. Commissioner Harry L. Tindall
was the Chair of the Study Committee on Collaborative Law. Nat'l Conference of
Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Meeting Minutes of the Committee on Scope and
Program 3 (July 8-9, 2006), available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/Minutes/
scope070806mn.pdf [hereinafter NCCUSL, Meeting Minutes]. NCCUSL Study
Committees are charged with reviewing an assigned area of law in light of defined
criteria and recommend whether NCCUSL should proceed with a draft on that
subject. Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, NCCUSL Committees,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=3&tabid=39 (last
visited Oct. 12, 2007).
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number of jurisdictions with local court rules providing for collabora-
tive law.97 The absence of pre-existing statutes was seen as advanta-
geous, improving the chances of NCCUSL's impact.9" The Study
Committee reported that "NCCUSL should set the mark in this area of
the law" and predicted "great legislative success."99 The Committee on
Scope and Program unanimously supported recommending that a
drafting committee be formed and approved a motion resolving "that a
drafting committee on collaborative law be formed, and that the com-
mittee be instructed to make a recommendation to the Committee on
Scope and Program on the scope of the project after its first
meeting."100
The appointment of the new Drafting Committee on Collaborative
Law was completed in early 2007 in preparation for the first drafting
session on April 20-21, 2007, held in Salt Lake City, Utah.' ' The
Drafting Committee, chaired by Commissioner Peter Munson, includes
seven additional State Commissioners appointed by NCCUSL and a
reporter, Andrew Schepard, from Hofstra University School of Law.10 2
In addition, there are several ABA Advisors and other ex officio mem-
bers.10 3 Finally, there are nearly a dozen official observers who
represent various stakeholders, such as the IACP, or are individuals
with particular expertise of value to the drafters. 10 4
97. NCCUSL, Meeting Minutes, supra note 96, at 3.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Letter from Leang Sou, NCCUSL, to Drafting Committee on a Collaborative
Law Act and Advisors/Observers, (Jan. 23, 2007) (on file with Campbell Law Review)
(describing meeting); see also Hofstra University School of Law, Uniform Collaborative
Law Act, http://aw.hofstra.edu/Academics/InstitutesAndCenters/ChildrenFamilies
AndTheLaw/UCLA/index.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2007) (discussing the timetable
for drafting the UCLA).
102. See Unif. Law Comm'n, Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws,
Collaborative Law, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/CommitteeSearchResults.aspx?
committee=279 (last visited Oct. 12, 2007) (listing the complete roster of the UCLA
Drafting Committee).
103. See id.
104. For example, Professor John Lande, Director of LL.M. Program in Dispute
Resolution at the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law and this author are
both official observers due to our scholarly interest in collaborative law. See Email
from Peter Munson, Chair, NCCUSL Drafting Committee on Uniform Collaborative
Law Act, to Chris Fairman, Professor of Law, The Ohio State Moritz College of Law
(Jan. 26, 2007 12:23:54 PM EST) (on file with Campbell Law Review) (inviting this
author to join the project as an observer and listing other participants).
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In addition to the inaugural meeting in April 2007, a second meet-
ing was recently held in Boise, Idaho on October 5 and 6, 2007.105
These sessions have already produced a working draft of the Uniform
Collaborative Law Act. °6 The drafting process will continue in the
spring of 2008, with a first reading of the UCLA to the annual
NCCUSL Conference slated for July 2008.107 Final consideration of
the Act will be in the summer of 2009.'08
While the process continues, the Drafting Committee has already
made some choices that will likely have a significant impact on collab-
orative law. First, the UCLA tentatively defines a "Dispute" as limited
to essentially family and divorce law.109 One concern among collabo-
rative lawyers is the extent to which the process can travel outside the
family law practice area." 0 If the UCLA chose a transsubstantive
approach, it could provide stimulus for the exportation of collaborative
law to other types of cases such as commercial disputes, employment
105. Memorandum from Andrew Schepard, Reporter, NCCUSL Drafting Comm. on
Unif. Collaborative Law Act, to Drafting Committee for the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Collaborative Law Act (Aug. 28, 2007) (on file
with Campbell Law Review (transmitting first draft of the UCLA and describing
October meeting).
106. See UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT (Draft for Discussion Only Oct. 2007),
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucla/oct2007draft.htm.
Additionally, the Reporter has created a website for the UCLA, http://www.
law.hofstra.edu/ucla (last visited January 29, 2008). There is a link on the website to
send comments to the Reporter and Drafting Committee.
107. See Email from Peter Munson, Chair, NCCUSL Drafting Committee on
Uniform Collaborative Law Act, to Chris Fairman, Professor of Law, The Ohio State
Moritz College of Law (Sept. 28, 2007 10:02:31 AM EDT) (on file with Campbell Law
Review) (regarding October meeting and future drafting schedule).
108. Id.
109. UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT § 2(c)(1), Draft for Discussion Only Oct. 2007,
[This section]requires that a Dispute must involve one or more of the
following:
(A) Custody, parenting time, visitation and decision-making for children;
(B) Dissolution of marriage, including divorce, annulment, and property
distribution;
(C) Alimony, spousal support, and child support including health care
expenses;
(D) Establishment and termination of the parent-child relationship,
including paternity, adoption, emancipation and guardianship of minors and
disabled persons.
110. See Frederick J. Glassman, Family Code Section 2013- The Official Arrival of
Collaborative Law in California, CAL. FAM. L. MONTHLY 275, 279 & n.17 (Sept. 2007)
available at http://www.mglawcorp.com/images/family-code.pdf, (describing concern
over using nonlawyer collaborative professionals and in applying collaborative law to
nonfamily law matters absent clear statutory guidance).
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law matters, or malpractice claims. If the current definition remains,
the UCLA will lack vitality outside of the family law context.
Even with a limitation in scope to family law, the UCLA signifi-
cantly advances collaborative law by focusing on the central elements
of collaborative law practice.' Current state statutes vary widely in
what they provide as structure for collaborative law. 1 2 The UCLA,
however, draws from current state models to define the basic tenets of
collaborative law in its definition of a "Collaborative Law Participation
Agreement.""1 3 By codifying the baseline, the UCLA will likely lead to
111. UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT § 2(b)(1) cmt. (Draft for Discussion Only Oct.
2007) ("This definition of what must be included in a Collaborative Law Participation
Agreement pulls together its commonly accepted elements.").
112. The California statute that took effect January 1, 2007, merely authorizes the
use of collaborative law process based upon a written agreement and provides a one
sentence definition of collaborative law. It is defined as a process in which the parties
and professionals engaged to assist them agree in writing to use their best efforts and
to make a good faith attempt to resolve disputes related to family law matters on an
agreed basis without resorting to adversary judicial intervention. CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 2013 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007). See Glassman, supra note 109, at 276 (noting "the
statute does not set forth any specific protocol for the collaborative law process).
Compare
113. UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT § 2(b)(1) (Draft for Discussion Only Oct. 2007).
This Section defines a Collaborative Law Participation Agreement with other
Parties to a Dispute as one providing that:
(A) A Party has the right to unilaterally terminate the Collaborative Law
Process at any time and for any cause or reason or no cause or reason by
written notice as provided in Section 5;
(B) Counsel for all Parties must withdraw from further representation if
the Collaborative Law Process is terminated as provided in Section 5;
(C) Counsel and any lawyer associated in the practice of law with
counsel who represented a Party in the Collaborative Law Process is
disqualified from representing any Party in any proceeding or matter
substantially related to the Dispute;
(D) Parties will make timely, full, candid and informal disclosure of
information reasonably related to the Dispute and have an obligation to
promptly update information previously provided in which there has
been a material change;
(E) Parties will jointly retain neutral experts who are disqualified from
testifying as witnesses in any proceeding substantially related to the
Dispute;
(F) Court intervention in the Dispute is suspended until the
Collaborative Law Process is terminated as provided for in Section 5;
(G) Statutes of limitations applicable to the Dispute are tolled until the
Collaborative Law Process is terminated as provided for in Section 4;
(H) Collaborative Law Communications are privileged from
admissibility into evidence in a Proceeding as provided in Section 7.
[Vol. 30:237
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greater uniformity while preserving individual autonomy to add other
provisions to any specific participation agreement. 114
Another goal of the UCLA is to describe the appropriate relation-
ship between collaborative law and the justice system." 15 One example
of this is the UCLA's codification of procedural guarantees, such as a
tolling of statutes of limitation.116 The UCLA also includes provisions
for appropriate judicial administration of collaborative cases, such as
filing a participation agreement with the court to exempt the action
from scheduling orders. 117
See also Unif. Collaborative Law Act § 2(b)(1) cmt.; ("This definition of what must be
included in a Collaborative Law Participation Agreement pulls together its commonly
accepted elements.")
114. Id. (stating "[t]his Section set forth a minimum floor for a Collaborative Law
Participation Agreement. Parties are free to supplement the provisions contained in
their own particular Agreements with additional terms that are not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Section.").
115. Id. Prefatory Note (describing the appropriate relationship of Collaborative
Law with the justice system as one of the UCLA's three goals).
116. Section 4(a) provides that the "signing of a Collaborative Law Participation
Agreement tolls all statutes of limitations applicable to the legal rights, claims and
causes of action of one Party against another Party reasonably related to Dispute until
Termination of the Collaborative Law Process." Id. § 4(a).
117. Section 6 provides for the judicial case management of collaborative law
disputes including:
(a) Parties may sign a Collaborative Law Participation Agreement and engage
in the Collaborative Law Process before a Dispute becomes the subject of a
proceeding. If the Parties initiate a proceeding to seek judicial approval of
any agreement reached through the Collaborative Law Process they shall
promptly file the Collaborative Law Participation Agreement with the court.
(b) Counsel shall file the Collaborative Law Participation Agreement with the
court or appropriate forum official promptly after it is signed when a
proceeding substantially related to the Dispute is pending at the time.
(c) The filing of the Collaborative Law Participation Agreement with the
court or other forum in a pending proceeding shall:
(1) exempt the action from required scheduling and case conferences;
(2) stay any pending motions or contested matters in the proceeding;
(3) stay scheduling and discovery orders previously entered in the
proceeding;
(4) exempt the Parties from participation in mandated education or
mediation programs and the like;
(5) exempt the proceeding from being placed on the court's or forum's
trial docket.
(d) The court or other forum shall not dismiss a pending proceeding in
which a Collaborative Law Participation Agreement is filed based on failure
to prosecute or delay without providing counsel and the Parties notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
23
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While these provisions provide a foundation for collaborative law,
the Drafting Committee decided in its first meeting to make the issue
of confidentiality and privilege a central focus of the UCLA. As such:
Many of the issues involved in the drafting of the Uniform Collabora-
tive Law Act, particularly those involving the scope of confidentiality
and evidentiary privilege, are identical to those that had to be resolved
in the drafting of the Uniform Mediation Act. As a result, some of the
provisions and the commentary in this Act are taken verbatim from the
Uniform Mediation Act.118
The detailed confidentiality and privilege portion of the UCLA is con-
tained in Section 7.119 The Drafting Committee also believes that mir-
roring the Uniform Mediation Act (UMA) will make enactment of the
UCLA easier; both NCCUSL and state legislatures are already familiar
with the concepts of confidentiality and evidentiary privilege because
of previous experience with the UMA. 120
(e) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to prevent the court or other
forum from:
(1) approving a settlement agreement and signing orders required by law
to effectuate the agreement of the Parties;
(2) entering emergency orders to protect the life, bodily integrity or
financial welfare of a Party or a child of a Party upon proper application;
(3) requiring counsel in pending proceedings in which a Collaborative
Law Participation Agreement has been filed to provide periodic written
status reports.
(f) When the Collaborative Law Process is terminated in a pending
proceeding, the court or other forum may on its own initiative:
(1) schedule a status conference;
(2) set a hearing or a trial;
(3) impose discovery deadlines;
(4) require compliance with scheduling orders;
(5) dismiss a pending proceeding;
(6) make such order as serves the interests of justice.
Id. § 6.
118. Id. Prefatory Note, at 7.
119. Section 7 sets forth the Uniform Collaborative Law Act's general structure for
protecting the confidentiality of Collaborative Law communications against disclosure
in later legal proceedings. It is based on similar provisions in the Uniform Mediation
Act, whose commentary should be consulted for more expansive discussion of the
issues raised and resolved in the drafting of the confidentiality provisions of this Act.
See Rule 12.8.4 UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT § 7 (Tentative Draft Oct. 2007), at 7.
120. Id. Prefatory Note, at 7. ("Drafting Committee gratefully acknowledges a major
debt to the drafters of the Uniform Mediation Act. The drafting of the Uniform
Mediation Act required the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to
comprehensively examine a dispute resolution process serving many of the same goals
as Collaborative Law, and ask what a statute could do to facilitate the growth and
development of that process.").
[Vol. 30:237260
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Finally, the UCLA is significant in what it excludes. Due to the
relative youth of collaborative law, care is being taken to avoid stifling
the innovative possibilities of the practice. For example, the UCLA
does not outline a specific training program for collaborative law, even
though the Drafting Committee is certainly on record as viewing ade-
quate training as essential.' 2 ' The Drafting Committee, however, does
not wish to impose one training regimen on all jurisdictions. 122
Another major drafting exclusion is a conscious effort to avoid
issues of professional ethics. According to the Drafting Committee:
The Uniform Collaborative Law Act defines and regulates a dispute
resolution process whose central feature is representation of parties by
counsel in problem solving, interest-based negotiations. The Act does
not, however, regulate the professional responsibility obligations of
counsel. Those obligations are established by the rules of professional
responsibility enacted in each jurisdiction and by the institutions that
regulate the conduct of lawyers, such as the judiciary and bar associa-
tion ethics committees.1
23
Notwithstanding this statement of drafting preference, it is clear that
the Drafting Committee does choose to address some ethical problems
with collaborative law as the provisions relating to confidentiality and
need for informed consent lie squarely within the realm of lawyer eth-
ics.124 The decision to ignore other ethical concerns about collabora-
tive law may constrain the potential impact of the UCLA. 125 Colorado
121. See id. Prefatory Note (discussing importance of training and education).
122. Id. Prefatory Note, at 9 ("Nonetheless, for fear of inflexibly regulating a still-
developing dispute resolution process, training and qualifications for counsel and
other professionals who participate in the Collaborative Law Process are not
prescribed by this Act.").
123. Id. Prefatory Note, at 7.
124. Two of the three professed goals of the UCLA involve questions of legal ethics.
The first goal, establishment of minimum terms and conditions for Collaborative Law
Participation Agreements, is designed to help ensure that parties considering
participating in collaborative law enter into the process with informed consent. This
is provided for in the UCLA in Section 3(a) imposing requirements such as: the
agreement must be in writing, with reasonable detail, describing the elements of
Section 2(b)(1), signed by the parties and counsel, and including appropriate language
as to waiver. See id. § 3(a). Similarly, the third goal, meeting the reasonable
expectations of parties and counsel for confidentiality of communications during the
collaborative law process, is met by the confidentiality and privilege requirements of
Section 7. See id. § 7.
125. As I have argued elsewhere, the best way to handle the numerous ethical
tensions between collaborative law and lawyer ethics is with a new Model Rule for
collaborative law. See generally Fairman, supra note 1 (advocating a new Model Rule);
Fairman, A Reply, supra note 3 (reiterating my call for a new Model Rule). While
NCCUSL certainly cannot promulgate a Model Rule, it could do much more than a
25
Fairman: Growing Pains: Changes in Collaborative Law and the Challenge of
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2008
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
Ethics Opinion 115 serves as a reference point. 126 Nothing in the cur-
rent draft of the UCLA prevents the reasoning or result of the
"nightmare" 127 Colorado Ethics Opinion.
The drafting of the UCLA is still in its formative stage. The Draft-
ing Committee might revisit some of these decisions as it moves from
drafting to enactment issues. The overall significance of the NCCUSL
effort, however, should not be underestimated. 128 The UCLA should
extinguish concerns that the collaborative process is somehow sus-
pect, or worse yet, illegal. The UCLA can also provide much needed
uniformity for essential collaborative law practices while maintaining
opportunities for experimentation. 129 The UCLA will solidify collabo-
prefatory comment tabling the issue. The Drafting Committee could take a more
expansive role in its commentary on the ethical compatibility of the UCLA with the
Model Rules. The Drafting Committee could include more provisions like
confidentiality that provide ethical clarity by reinforcing a preexisting duty under the
Model Rules. The Drafting Committee could be more assertive of ensuring an ethical
foundation by even including new, stand-alone ethical duties for counsel. These new
ethical duties contained in a substantive statute would mirror the approach that
Sarbanes-Oxley took with its new confidentiality provisions. If the Drafting Committee
was uncomfortable with promulgating in this area, it could invite representatives of the
ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility or the Center for
Professional Responsibility to participate in a joint drafting project. Unfortunately, it
appears that providing much needed ethical guidance for collaborative law will be a
missed opportunity of the NCCUSL effort.
126. See Colo. Formal Op. 115, supra note 4.
127. See Chanen, supra note 79 (using nightmare label to describe Colorado Ethics
Opinion 115).
128. See Lande, supra note 40 ("The NCCUSL effort, and especially the hard work of
dispute resolution practitioners and organizations focusing on Collaborative and
Cooperative Law, could have a very significant impact on the future of dispute
resolution.").
129. As the drafters explain:
Rather than enshrine a particular model of Collaborative Law Practice into
statute, the Uniform Collaborative Law Act aims to establish a platform for
the recognition and future development of Collaborative Law. It thus does
not regulate in detail how Collaborative Law should be conducted. The Act
draws this balance to promote the autonomy of the parties by leaving to them
and their counsel those matters that can be set by agreement and need not be
set inflexibly by statute. Furthermore, the Act anticipates the future growth
and development of Collaborative Law by authorizing the judicial branch to
promulgate supplemental regulations that are consistent with it provisions.
UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT, Prefatory Note (Tentative Draft Oct. 2007), at 8.
[Vol. 30:237262
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rative law as a legitimate ADR process while providing opportunity for
its growth and development. 130
C. ABA Formal Opinion 07-447
Much of the uncertainty generated by Colorado Ethics Opinion
115 should dissipate by the recently released ABA Formal Ethics Opin-
ion 07-447, "Ethical Considerations in Collaborative Law Practice." 131
In this latest opinion, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Pro-
fessional Responsibility analyzes "the implications of the Model Rules
on collaborative law practice"'132 and concludes that collaborative law
does not violate the Model Rules of Professional Conduct if the client
gives informed consent. 133 The opinion states:
Before representing a client in a collaborative law process, a lawyer
must advise the client of the benefits and risks of participation in the
process. If the client has given his or her informed consent, the lawyer
may represent the client in the collaborative law process. A lawyer who
engages in collaborative resolution processes still is bound by the rules
of professional conduct, including the duties of competence and
diligence. 134
In a nutshell, collaborative law is not per se unethical. 135
The Standing Committee begins its analysis by describing collabo-
rative law as "a type of alternative dispute resolution in which the par-
ties and their lawyers commit to work cooperatively to reach a
settlement" with its roots and attributes in the mediation process.
136
Noting the rapid spread of collaborative law throughout the United
States and into Canada, Australia, and Western Europe, 137 the Stand-
ing Committee appears to credit this growth to the numerous estab-
130. Id. ("A Uniform Collaborative Law Act will help bring order and understanding
of the Collaborative Law Process across state lines, and encourage the growth and
development of Collaborative Law in a number of ways.").
131. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-447 (2007)
[hereinafter ABA Op. 07-447]. Despite being dated in early August, the public release
of the formal opinion did not occur until early October. See Email from George
Kuhlman, Ethics Counsel and Associate Director, Center for Professional
Responsibility, to Eric Fish, NCCUSL (Sept. 28, 2007, 6:10 AM) (on file with
Campbell Law Review) (detailing that the collaborative law opinion had not been
officially released yet and would be circulated "next week" [October 2007] despite
August date on opinion).
132. ABA Op. 07-447, supra note 129, at 1.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. Id,
137. Id. at 1-2.
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lished collaborative law organizations that "develop local practice
protocols, train practitioners, reach out to the public, and build refer-
ral networks,"'138 such as the International Academy of Collaborative
Professionals (IACP).' 39
According to the Standing Committee, the variations of collabora-
tive practice all share the same core elements set out in a contract, or
"four-way" agreement, between the clients and their lawyers.14 ° "In
that agreement, the parties commit to negotiating a mutually accept-
able settlement without court intervention, to engaging in open com-
munication and information sharing, and to creating shared solutions
that meet the needs of both clients."'' The commitment to the collab-
orative process is ensured in the four-way agreement with a withdrawal
requirement; "if the process breaks down, the lawyers will withdraw
from representing their respective clients and will not handle any sub-
sequent court proceedings."' 142
The Standing Committee then turned to the ethical landscape.
The limited authorities are divided into two camps. There are those
states which treat collaborative law practice as a species of limited
scope representation. Opinions from these jurisdictions (Kentucky,
New Jersey, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania) discuss the duties of
lawyers, including communication, competence, diligence, and confi-
dentiality, and conclude that collaborative law is not inherently incon-
sistent with the Model Rules. 14 3 "However, even those opinions are
guarded, and caution that collaborative practice carries with it a poten-
tial for significant ethical difficulties."' 44 And then there is Colorado-
"the only opinion to conclude that a non-consentable conflict arises in
collaborative practice."'145
138. Id. at 2.
139. Id. ("On its website, the International Academy of Collaborative Professionals
describes its mission as fostering professional excellence in conflict resolution by
protecting the essentials of collaborative practice, expanding collaborative practice
worldwide, and providing a central resource for education, networking, and standards
of practice."). The website of the IACP is at: www.collaborativepractice.com.
140. Id.
141. ABA Op. 07-447, supra note 129, at 2.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2-3.
144. Id. at 3. I certainly agree with the accuracy of this statement. See Fairman,
supra note 1, at 108-16; Fairman, A Reply, supra note 3, at 723-24. 1 am, however,
troubled by the Committee's use of authority for its statement. It cites merely "Supra
note 6." ABA Op. 07-447, supra note 129, at 3 n.8. Footnote 6 merely states, "See
http://www.collaborativepractice.com/t2.asp?T=mission." Id. at 2 n.6. This internet
citation takes one to the IACP website and the IACP mission statement.
145. Id. at 2 n.7.
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The Standing Committee wasted no time in selecting its team: "we
agree that collaborative law practice and the provisions of the four-way
agreement represent a permissible limited scope representation under
Model Rule 1.2, with the concomitant duties of competence, diligence,
and communication" and "reject the suggestion that collaborative law
practice sets up a non-waivable conflict under [Model] Rule
1.7(a)(2).' '1 46
According to the ABA Opinion, "[Model] Rule 1.2(c) permits a
lawyer to limit the scope of a representation so long as the limitation is
reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed con-
sent."'147 Nothing in Model Rule 1.2 or its comment suggests that limit-
ing the representation to a collaborative effort to reach a settlement is
per se unreasonable. 148 In fact, Comment 6 to Model Rule 1.2 pro-
vides that a limited representation is appropriate if the client has lim-
ited objectives for the representation and limited representation
includes exclusion of "specific means that might otherwise be used to
accomplish the client's objectives."'149
Concluding that collaborative law is a reasonable scope limita-
tion, the issue is reduced to one of informed consent by the client. To
get a client's informed consent requires "that the lawyer communicate
adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and
reasonably available alternatives to the limited representation. '15 Spe-
cifically, the "lawyer must provide adequate information about the
rules or contractual terms governing the collaborative process, its
advantages and disadvantages, and the alternatives."'15' One core ele-
ment of collaborative law is singled out: "The lawyer also must assure
that the client understands that, if the collaborative law procedure
does not result in settlement of the dispute and litigation is the only
recourse, the collaborative lawyer must withdraw and the parties must
retain new lawyers to prepare the matter for trial."'' 5 2
Finally, the ABA takes Colorado to task for its conclusion that col-
laborative practice creates a non-waivable conflict of interest under
Rule 1.7(a)(2). Although the Committee agreed that the withdrawal
provision of the four-way agreement creates a "responsibility to a third
party" within the meaning of Rule 1.7(a)(2), this responsibility does
146. Id. at 2.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 6 (2006).
150. ABA Op. 07-447, supra note 7, at 2.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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not create a conflict of interest.153 A conflict under Model Rule
1.7(a)(2) exists "if there is a significant risk that the representation [of
the client] will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer."154 With
collaborative law, the agreement to withdraw does not impair the law-
yer's ability to represent the client. Because the client has already
agreed to a limited scope representation (collaborative negotiation
toward settlement), "the lawyer's agreement to withdraw if the collabo-
ration fails is not an agreement that impairs her ability to represent the
client, but rather is consistent with the client's limited goals for the
representation."'15 5 Since the client specifically limits the scope of the
lawyer's representation to the collaborative negotiation of a settlement,
there is no foreclosing of alternatives otherwise available to the
client. 156
The Committee leaves no doubt where it stands: the withdrawal
agreement of collaborative law is not inherently unethical. As its first
look at collaborative law, it is somewhat surprising that the ABA Opin-
ion is not more measured, especially after specifically noting that the
previous state bar opinions on collaborative law are "guarded" and
stress the "potential for significant ethical difficulties.' 1 57 This Opin-
ion comes with little cautionary language."15 Collaborative lawyers still
must comply with the rest of the Model Rules such as competence,
diligence, and communication. 159 The Opinion also explicitly reserves
comment on any ethical considerations from a lawyer's participation
in a collaborative law group or organization. 160 But on what has been
a hot-button ethical question about collaborative law-the viability of
153. Id at 3.
154. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2006).
155. ABA Op. 07-447, supra note 7, at 4.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2.
158. In fact, the ABA Opinion includes numerous glowing descriptions of
collaborative law that collectively appear like promotional material for the
collaborative law movement. Some of these descriptions include: "a type of alternative
dispute resolution in which the parties and their lawyers commit to work cooperatively
to reach a settlement;" rooted in the mediation process; "focus[ed] on the interests of
both clients;" "gather[s] sufficient information to insure that decisions are made with
full knowledge;" develops a full range of options; "choose[s] options that best meet the
needs of the parties;" "mutually acceptable written resolution of all issues without
court involvement;" creates a problem-solving atmosphere; promotes interest-based
negotiation; and facilitates client empowerment. Id. at 1.
159. Id. at 1.
160. Id. at 1 n.2 ("We do not discuss the ethical considerations that arise in
connection with a lawyer's participation in a collaborative law group or
266 [Vol. 30:237
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the withdrawal provision of the four-way agreement-the Committee
provides a definitive answer.' 6 1
This new ABA Opinion has been greeted with superlatives.
"[C]ivilized resolution of conflict in American society recently took a
giant step forward,"1 62 "an important stride,"' 163  a "watershed
moment, 164 and "reaffirms the value of the collaborative process," 165
are just some of the recent labels commentators-all collaborative law
proponents-have used. There are also predictions that the use of col-
laborative law will increase dramatically throughout the United
States.166 Of course, it is much too early to gauge the impact of the
ABA Opinion. After all, state bar ethics committees are not required to
follow ABA ethics opinions, although most do. This should justifiably
give collaborative lawyers a confidence boost, especially in the major-
ity of jurisdictions that have not yet addressed the ethics of collabora-
tive law.
III. A PROGNOSIS FOR COLLABORATIVE LAW
A. Unanswered Ethical Questions
The ABA Opinion is a significant counterpoint to the Colorado
Ethics Committee's poorly reasoned conflicts analysis. The ABA lights
the path of limitation on the scope of representation under Rule 1.2 as
the proper way to view collaborative law. My guess is that in every
jurisdiction-save Colorado-the withdrawal agreement will be ana-
lyzed as the ABA Opinion suggests. This does not mean, however, that
collaborative law is out of the ethical woods just yet.
organization."); see also Maryland Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 2004-23 (2004) (discussing
ethical propriety of "collaborative dispute resolution non-profit organization").
161. It is surprising that the Committee limits its analysis to Model Rules 1.2 and
1.7 after explicitly noting that other state authorities also analyze the disqualification
obligation under Rules 1.16 or 5.6. See ABA Op. 07-447, supra note 7, at 2. While one
could assume that the Committee's silence implies a lack of applicability, it is possible
that these other Model Rules may have some vitality on this question.
162. Hoffman, supra note 12.
163. ABA Says Collaborative Law is Ethical, http://www.lawyer-coach.com/
raisingthebar/index.php/2007/10/10/aba-says-collaborative-law-is-ethical/ (Oct. 10,
2007, 12:33 PM).
164. David A. Hoffman, Lawyers Who Mediate, Not Litigate, Sacramento Bee Wire
Opinion, Oct. 8, 2007, http://www.sacbee.com/846/story/421354.html.
165. David C. Sarnacki. Ethical Considerations in Collaborative Divorce, Domestic
Diversions, Oct. 11, 2007, http://domesticdiversions.com/index.php/ethical-
considerations-in-collaborative-divorce/.
166. Hoffman, supra note 12.
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There are many ethical issues facing collaborative law that the
ABA Opinion does not address. It is silent on the effect of Model Rule
1.16 and its provisions relating to termination of representation.
167
Does Rule 1.16 have no application at all to the withdrawal provision
or is this reserved for another day? Given that North Carolina, Penn-
sylvania, and Kentucky all looked in part to Rule 1.16 in their opinions
on collaborative law, its applicability remains an open question.' 68
Similarly, the ABA Opinion recognizes the vital role played by
informed consent, yet offers no guidance on what measures are neces-
sary to comply. Is there a heightened duty of informed consent
required as Kentucky and New Jersey indicate?
1 69
167. Model Rule 1.16, "Declining Or Terminating Representation" states:
(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from
representing a client if:
(1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on
the interests of the client;
(2) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services
that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(3) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or
fraud;
(4) the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers
repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement;
(5) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer
regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning
that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;
(6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on
the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or
(7) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
(c) A lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or
permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation. When ordered
to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation
notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the
extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other
counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and
refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or
incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent
permitted by other law.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2006).
168. See N.C. St. Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 1 (2002); Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal
Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 2004-24 (2004); Ky. Bar Ass'n Ethics
Comm., Op. E-425 (2005).
169. See Ky. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. E-425 (2005); NJ. Advisory Comm. on
Prof'l Ethics, Op. 699 (2005).
[Vol. 30:237268
32
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol30/iss2/1
2008] COLLABORATIVE LAW AND THE CHALLENGE OF LEGAL ETHICS 269
Another ethical conflict that looms on the horizon is the incom-
patibility of the current candor duty in Model Rule 4.1 with collabora-
tive law. On April 12, 2006, the ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility reiterated its commitment to the puff-
ery exception to the duty of candor in negotiation, and explicitly
expanded it to apply to caucused mediation:
[U]nder Model Rule 4.1, in the context of a negotiation, including a
caucused mediation, a lawyer representing a client may not make a
false statement of material fact to a third person. However, statements
regarding a party's negotiating goals or its willingness to compromise,
as well as statements that can fairly be characterized as negotiation
"puffing," ordinarily are not considered "false statements of material
fact" within the meaning of the Model Rules.1 7 °
Thus, Model Rule 4.1 permits attorneys to lie under the puffery excep-
tion for negotiation as well as mediation. Absent some intervening eth-
ical guidance to the contrary, the same standard must apply to
collaborative law.
Confidentiality and privilege issues also require resolution; the
ABA opinion process, however, cannot offer the needed solution.
Unprotected in all but a handful of jurisdictions, information
exchanged or obtained in the collaborative law process is potentially
subject to discovery.171 After the breakdown of the collaborative pro-
cess, a party could subpoena a previously withdrawn expert-or even
the other side's lawyer-to testify during litigation as to what happened
during the collaborative process. 172 In the absence of an explicit rule
or statute applicable to collaborative law, confidentiality is derived
contractually from the participation agreement and the general under-
standing that the parties are engaged in settlement discussions. 1 73
Adoption of legally enforceable safeguards to protect the integrity of
the process is appropriate. This is where the NCUSSL project comes
into play. If the Committee continues in its current direction, confiden-
tiality and privilege for collaborative law can be addressed by the adop-
tion of a uniform act to model for the states how to incorporate these
protections.
170. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-439 (2006).
171. Voegele et al., supra note 30, at 1022.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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B. Challenges of a Nuanced Model
Collaborative law is no longer practiced according to a unified
model. A spectrum of forms and styles now exist.17 4 Some collabora-
tive cases have such intense negotiations that they become so "pro-
tracted, positional, and adversarial that they are virtually
indistinguishable from ordinary negotiation in a high-conflict case." '175
Other cases involve negotiations that proceed smoothly and on such
cordial terms that they are more like transformative mediation. 176 As
collaborative law begins to blur at the edges, so do other forms of ADR
such as adversarial mediation and meditative arbitration. 7 7 What
remains is a rich spectrum of dispute resolution processes where there
may be few clear lines of demarcation. 178
As the lines erase between ADR processes, "[tihere is a disturbing
tendency for ADR providers in one territory to fear, and question the
value of, the procedures used on the other side of the border." Despite
their close connection, tension exists between mediation and collabo-
rative law. 179 Collaborative lawyers criticize mediation for abandoning
divorcing clients when they are most vulnerable because divorce medi-
ation is often done as a three-way meeting between the spouses and the
mediator without counsel present. 8 ° Divorce mediation advocates
cast collaborative lawyers into the same pile as other lawyer-negotia-
tors; all lawyers increase tension because of their inherent need to
advocate on behalf of their client.' 8 ' In fact, tension between collabo-
rative lawyers and mediation proponents is credited with killing the
Texas legislative effort to codify collaborative law for non-family law
cases. 182
174. David A. Hoffman, Exploring the Boundaries and Terrain of ADR Practice:
Mediation, Arbitration, and Collaborative Law, 14 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 4 (2007).
175. Id. at 5
176. Id.
177. See id. at 6-7 (describing adversarial mediation and meditative arbitration).
178. There are those, however, who see the spectrum but believe each process
"should have clear boundaries." Daniel M. Weitz, Renovations to the Multidoor
Courthouse, 14 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 21 (2007).
179. Voegele et al., supra note 30, at 997 (noting that both processes are client-
centered, transparent, and require full disclosure, confidentiality, and non-court
resolution).
180. Hoffman, supra note 174, at 7.
181. Id.
182. See Mary Flood, Collaborative Law Can Make Divorces Cheaper, Civilized,
HOUSTON CHRON., June 4, 2007, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/
business/flood/4856355.html ("Trial lawyers opposed it this year, saying mediation
offers people a better way to work out a divorce and noting couples can get stuck
paying their collaborative lawyers and attorneys for a lawsuit.").
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The same type of in-fighting exists within the various forms of
collaborative practice: collaborative divorce versus collaborative law
versus cooperative law. In its original form, collaborative law involved
only lawyers. In some regions, however, an interdisciplinary team pro-
cess has developed.' 83 Licensed mental health professionals trained in
family separation and dissolution of marriage are used as collaborative
coaches. 18 4 Financial specialists, child-development specialists, and
other professionals can also be members of the team. 18 5 This interdis-
ciplinary practice is commonly described as "collaborative divorce,"
while the lawyers-only process is called "collaborative law."' 86 Despite
their similarities, these two groups are currently involved in a disheart-
ening debate, and it seems that "more than just a little of it is related to
those tired, old turf notions."'18 7 For example, since lawyers are not
trained as mental health, child, or financial specialists, their role in
collaborative divorce could certainly be reduced. 188 The lawyer's role
as leader of the collaborative team may be in jeopardy-a change many
lawyers are likely to resist. It is unsurprising that tensions exist
between the interdisciplinary approach and lawyer-driven one.
The rise of cooperative law causes identical tensions for the ADR
world. Recall that cooperative law is essentially a collaborative process
without its defining characteristic-the withdrawal agreement. 189
Because of its perceived central importance to collaborative law doc-
trine, there is an ongoing debate about the efficacy and value of the
provision.' 90 The rhetoric is sometimes heated as one would expect
183. Sanford Portnoy, How Divorce Coaching Can Help, 3 COLLABORATIVE L.J. 23, 24
(2005) ("In the interdisciplinary approach to collaborative law lawyers and mental
health professional coaches work in teams to provide both clients a comprehensive
package of services aimed at producing a reasonable, non-damaging settlement.").
184. Voegele et al., supra note 30, at 996.
185. Id. at 996-97.
186. Daniel M. Weitz, Renovations to the Multidoor Courthouse, 14 Disp. RESOL. MAG.
21, 22 (2007).
187. Frances Z. Calafiore, ADR Community Not Immune to Truf Wars, CONN. LAW
TRIBUNE, Apr. 3, 2006, at 16; see Frances Z. Calafiore, Practice Makes Perfect, CONN.
LAW TRIBUNE, Feb. 27, 2006, at 2 (noting tension between collaborative law and
collaborative practice); see also supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
188. See id.
189. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (describing the cooperative law
model and conflict with collaborative law).
190. See Calafiore, supra note 94 (describing the turf war between collaborative and
cooperative law groups).
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when a challenge is made to what one side holds as a central tenet of
its belief system.' 9 '
What underlies all of these conflicts-mediation versus collabora-
tion, interdisciplinary or lawyer-only, with or without withdrawal-is a
fear that the market is just too small for all these variations to coexist;
there are too few cases to go around.192 Another commentator attrib-
utes the tension to rhetoric: "the fervor with which Collaborative Law
lawyers speak about Collaborative Law" implies a superiority to other
forms of ADR in both process and results.' 93 Or is it not what is said,
but what is not said: a fear of the "hidden agenda" and "whose ox is
being gored."' 94 Recently, some attention has been given to discussing
these tensions openly, and identifying the benefits the different
processes can have for clients. 195 More dialogue is necessary.
Ultimately, this type of infighting is a disservice to the public.
Large numbers of disputes could just as easily be handled in adver-
sarial litigation, mediation, collaborative law, or one of its varia-
tions.' 96 The great challenge for the ADR movement as a whole is to
begin to embrace the differences that provide such a spectrum of
choice for legal consumers. Only then can collaborative practitioners,
as well as all lawyers, fulfill their commitment to the profession and
their clients through a truly informed process.
CONCLUSION
This has certainly been a robust year for the intersection of collab-
orative law and legal ethics. Three major events have emerged to shape
the future of what has been called an oxymoron-"collaborative
law."'197 The threat of lawyer ethical rules limiting collaborative law
191. Illustrative of the type of tension that exists between these groups, consider the
recent statements by collaborative lawyer Frederick Glassman, who called cooperative
law an "undefined process." Glassman, supra note 106, at 279. He feared cooperative
law supporters might "grasp onto the generalities of the new [California collaborative
law] statute." Id. Glassman further marginalized cooperative law by stating:
"[riegardless of whether attorneys are engaged in the litigation model or in some other
'cooperative law' model, attorneys should always cooperate in trying to settle their
cases ...." Id.
192. Voegele et al., supra note 30, at 997; Calafiore, supra note 94 ("The most side-
stepped, glossed over or diminished issue in discussions between lawyers and clients
regarding the pros and cons of various dispute resolution processes is, for many, the
one most likely to affect the outcome: what's the effect on the lawyer's bottom line.").
193. Voegele et al., supra note 30, at 997-98.
194. Calafiore, supra note 94.
195. Id.
196. Hoffman, supra note 174, at 7.
197. Id.
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leaped from the law journals into reality with the Colorado Opinion.
The response of the collaborative law community, typified by the IACP
critique, was quick, thoughtful, and designed to corral this maverick
state ethics committee. It certainly appears to have delivered an S-O-S
to the ABA Standing Committee, as its rebuke of Colorado's faulty con-
flicts analysis makes quite clear. Throughout this ethics opinion ping-
pong match, the NCCUSL Drafting Committee is hard at work to pro-
vide additional legislative support for collaborative law by promulgat-
ing a uniform act.
These events of 2007 reflect collaborative law entering its adoles-
cence. To be sure, the growth of collaborative law is not over; some
challenging ethical questions remain. Collaborative law should expect
continued resistance and ethical challenges from those who view the
adversarial nature of representation as fundamental. But it is not only
zealous advocates who challenge collaborative law. There is also an
increasing risk that, as this movement matures, the nuances of collabo-
rative thinking could create an ADR turf war between collaborative
practice and mediation, collaborative divorce and collaborative law, or
collaborative and cooperative law. The collaborative movement will
need all of its problem-solving skills if its own family starts to dissolve.
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